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Advertising, Collective Action, and Labeling in the European 
Wine Markets
Stéphan Marette and Angelo Zago
In this paper we consider the role for collective action in advertising investments needed to compete on foreign markets 
and/or to enter into new markets. We model the choices facing producers in regions where both AO (high quality) and 
table (low quality) wines are produced. By joining forces with producers of other regions to invest in advertising, pro-
ducers may penetrate into new markets. We show that it is profitable to enter into the new markets when, other things 
being equal, the size of the new market is relatively big, when the traditional market is relatively small, and when the 
size of the fixed investment in advertising is relatively small. We discuss the policy implications of the results, examin-
ing possible modifications of the AO system to facilitate collective action and improve investment levels. 
new market they have to compete with the producers 
from the rest of the world. In the traditional mar-
ket, they have to decide how to allocate production 
between the AO and the table wines. In these mar-
kets, they face a market for vertically differentiated 
wine—in which each region is a monopolist—or a 
Cournot competition for homogeneous products, 
respectively. We determine when it is profitable for 
producers to join forces to make the fixed invest-
ments in advertising needed to enter new markets. 
We show that entering new markets may be profit-
able, other things being equal, if the size of the new 
markets is big, the fixed costs of advertising are rela-
tively low, and the situation in the internal market 
is relatively bad. We discuss the policy implications 
of the results, examining the possible modifications 
of the AO system to facilitate collective action and 
improve investment levels. 
The AO System and the Recent Changes in the 
World Market
Wine characteristics may be classified under two 
categories reflecting consumers’ preferences: 
vertical and horizontal product differentiation. 
Under vertical differentiation, if products of dif-
fering quality are proposed at the same price, all 
consumers will only buy products with the highest 
level of quality. Brands, chateaux, or vineyards try 
to promote quality. Conversely, under horizontal 
differentiation (tastes), if products with differ-
ent characteristics are offered at the same price, 
consumers will choose goods according to their 
individual preferences for the various characteris-
tics. The horizontal-differentiation dimension may 
be taken to explain the two types of organization, 
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The wine-world market is characterized by two 
principal wine suppliers: European, based on the 
Appellation of Origin (AO) organization; and the 
New World, mainly promoted by new countries, 
with an organization based on the type of grape. 
After decades of European domination in the world 
markets, the wine-producers of Australia, Califor-
nia, Chile, and other emerging wine producing 
countries are challenging the European leadership 
(Wittwer, Berger, and Anderson 2003). One ques-
tion that arises in this evolving market situation 
is whether the AO system should be reformed or 
abandoned altogether. 
In this paper we consider the role for collective 
action in advertising investments needed to compete 
in foreign markets or to enter into new markets. We 
model the choices facing producers in regions where 
both AO and wines of lower quality are produced. 
In the initial situation, each region needs to allocate 
production between these two markets. We assume 
a fixed supply of land to represent the choices fac-
ing the agricultural sector in the short run, and the 
fact that the land suitable for grape production in a 
particular region is given. We thus represent produc-
ers’ decisions when they choose between growing 
the low-quality or the higher-quality version. In 
addition, we model a different situation in which 
producers may consider joining forces to enter into 
a new market by allocating part of their production 
to be sold into the new market. 
We thus have a multiple-stage game in which 
producers choose whether to enter into the new 
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namely the European one, based on the AO,1 and 
that of other world countries, based on the types of 
grape—that is the vin de cépage, or varietal wine, 
such as Chardonnay, Cabernet, or Merlot. Wines 
have such a diversity of tastes that, for instance, if 
a Bordeaux, linked to the AO system, or a Cabernet, 
a varietal wine, were offered at the same price, there 
would still be a demand for each of them. 
Product promotion and/or the signal of verti-
cal and horizontal characteristics are crucial in 
this context of multiple options for indicating the 
wine content. If consumers are not fully informed 
about product characteristics, they may consume 
an undesired characteristic or pay a price that does 
not reflect, for example, the uncertainty associated 
with the good in question. Imperfect information 
concerns search characteristics as they are revealed 
before purchasing but at a cost that can be high, or 
experience characteristics as they are revealed after 
purchasing (Nelson 1970). Even with search goods, 
consumers may have difficulty recognizing or re-
membering product quality if the overall quality is 
defined by a great number of characteristics or if 
the product’s origin is uncertain. Since numerous 
vineyards exist, the signal of specific characteristics 
is very difficult for an isolated vineyard, because an 
individual vineyard’s ability to implement a signal-
ing strategy or a promotion campaign depends on its 
profitability, and the more competitive a market, the 
more difficult it is to signal a high level of quality 
via price or vineyard advertising. Simply put, given 
a perfectly competitive market, a firm needs some 
economic rent to allow it to finance quality signal, 
advertising, or promotion campaigns. All those 
difficulties raise the issue of the best individual or 
collective systems for promoting wine in a context 
of intense competition on the world market. 
The wine sector in the European Union is based 
on the Appellation of Origin (AO) for medium- and 
high-quality wines and the table-wine standard for 
low-quality wines. Wine-making for the AO sys-
tem in the European Union is very regulated and 
based on tradition, with a big role assigned to local 
wines whose name is generally associated with the 
production region, e.g., Bordeaux, Chianti, Rioja, 
Porto. Wines in the AO system are often made by 
blending specific and sometimes local grape vari-
eties; their grape production is regulated, with a 
maximum yield allowed per unit of land, and their 
production regions are strongly delimited (Heien 
and Martin 2002). The AO system is defined at 
national and European levels. Even if European 
consumers respond to these AO based upon regional 
characteristics, the European system raises the ques-
tion of the appellations proliferation. Peri and Gaeta 
(1999) count more than 400 official appellations in 
the wine sector in Italy alone and 1397 in the wine 
sector in Europe. Such a profusion assures product 
diversity but certainly increases buyer confusion 
(Consumer Reports 1997; Sopexa 2001). The rec-
ognition of quality labels by French consumers is 
only 12% for Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée, the 
French AO system (Loisel and Couvreur 2001). One 
major problem is the legibility and clarity of a label, 
especially for those showing some official seal.2 
Although the AO system has proven successful 
in guaranteeing a good reputation for many Euro-
pean wines and relatively high profits for their wine 
producers, as well as such positive externalities 
as employment and rural development (Giraud-
Héraud, Soler, and Tanguy 2002), countries such 
as France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have witnessed 
a tremendous growth of New World wine-makers 
in the last few years. Indeed, the wine producers 
of Australia, California, Chile, and other emerg-
ing wine producing countries are challenging the 
European leadership in world markets (Anderson 
2001; The Economist 1999). 
Common characteristics of the emerging wine-
producing countries are the lack of detailed rules, 
i.e., the freedom to experiment with new techniques; 
the production and marketing of wines according 
to single varieties—e.g., Chardonnay—sometimes 
associated with the production region; and a very 
intense use of marketing investments. All those 
features appear to be very relevant to the U.S. and 
other importing markets (Anderson 2001). More-
over, the farming, wine-making, and trading opera- 1 In fact, quality wines in the EU are officially defined 
as Vins de Qualité Produits dans le Regions Determinées 
(VQPRD), and they are further defined for each country. 
For instance, Denominazione di Origine Controllata 
(DOC) in Italy, Denominacìon de Origen in Spain, 
Appelation d’Origine Controlée (AOC) in France. In the 
text we generically refer to AO. See Lucatelli (2000) for 
more details about AO.
2 Berthomeau (2002) discusses the difficulty that 
the various French appellations have had in entering 
new export markets due to the absence of any clear 
specification on the label that distinguishes one 
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tions in Australia and other New World countries 
are much bigger than in the European ones. For 
instance, the average vineyard in France is less 
than 2 hectares, versus 111 hectares in Australia. 
Four firms—Foster, Southcorp, Hardy, and Orlando 
Wyndham—dominate the Australian market. In 
addition, recent international mergers revamped 
international wine trading (Marsh 2003a, 2003b). 
In 2000, Foster merged with Beringer, a California 
wine firm. In 2003, Hardy will merge with Constel-
lation Brands, a U.S. company. As Marsh (2003b) 
puts it, those mergers “threaten to undermine further 
Europe’s dominance of the sector.”
Unlike that of New World countries, the Euro-
pean wine industry is very fragmented and appears 
relatively uninterested in the consolidation pro-
cesses that are taking place worldwide, especially 
in Australia and the USA. (The Economist 2003; 
Marsh 2003a, 2003b). The opportunities for merg-
ers in Europe are limited by ownership structures 
with very scattered producers, geographic bound-
aries, and product diversity. Indeed, apart from 
some notable exceptions—e.g., the Champagne 
(The Economist 2003), Bordeaux, or Tuscany re-
gions—the wine industry in Europe is made up of 
many small firms, which may lack adequate capital 
for the required investments in new technologies 
and marketing policies (Giraud-Héraud, Soler, and 
Tanguy 2002).3 For some commentators there were 
too many EU interventions and subsidies that have 
impaired the ability of the wine sector to adapt 
to changing market conditions, but it is believed 
that the 1999 reform of the EU Common Market 
Organization should change producers’ incentives 
and reduce the previous perverse effects. Indeed, 
this reform will provide for large expenditures for 
the restructuring and conversion of vineyards to 
produce more marketable varieties of grapes 
One question that arises in this evolving market 
situation is whether the AO system is still viable, 
or if it should be reformed or abandoned altogether. 
Although it has been the backbone of the French 
and EU wine sectors in the last decades, some argue 
that the system needs to be reformed (Berthomeau 
2002). The problem is that in many new mar-
kets—e.g., the U.S. and UK markets—consumers 
are drinking more wine, becoming more aware of 
the international supply of different types of wine, 
and preferring those which can be more easily 
recognized. For example, consumers may prefer 
to buy wines that are made from a grape variety 
recognized worldwide, such as Chardonnay, Cab-
ernet, or Merlot. 
In this respect, some AO wines could find it 
difficult to be easily recognized and evaluated by 
consumers in international markets. Consumers buy 
wines first by choosing the country or region of 
origin and then by comparing different prices and 
qualities (Sopexa 2001). It is in this second stage 
that some consumers may feel confused and fear 
the risk of uncertain quality, given that there are 
plenty of different AOs to choose from. In addition, 
since each AO is provided with a limited supply and 
hence low market penetration in the usual marketing 
channels, some argue that the system cannot deal 
with modern marketing systems and new market 
demand. One possibility would be for different re-
gions with AO systems to join forces—by produc-
ing a common wine, for instance a “Chardonnay 
de France,” and having collective investments in 
advertising to enter into new markets, the producers 
in these regions could be able to increase their sales 
and thus their profits.4
These examples raise the issue of the optimal 
way to promote products. This paper does not at-
tempt to provide a complete cost-benefit analysis 
3 A partial solution to the size problem, according to 
some practitioners, may be the collective organization by 
farmers through cooperatives and other producer groups. 
Indeed, cooperatives in the European wine industry are 
very common and in some regions have a considerable 
market share of production and processing facilities. In 
the early ’90s, for instance, in Italy the market share of 
cooperatives in the wine sector was about 55%, in Spain 
70%, and in France about 39–74% (Cogeca 1998).
4 This may appear to be an extreme simplification. 
Notice, however, that the wine market is very segmented. 
For instance, in the U.S., the market is segmented among 
at least Ultra-premium (with prices above $14 per bottle), 
Super-premium (prices of $7–14, with Cabernet, Merlot, 
and Chardonnay types of wine), Fighting varietals ($3–7, 
with Australia and Chile being the main producers) and 
Jug wine (the lowest end) (Heien and Martin 2002). What 
we model in the paper could be a situation where AO 
wines (the most famous ones, at least) already sell in 
the Ultra-premium segment abroad, getting a handsome 
premium (Seale, Marchant, and Basso 2003), while the 
Chardonnay de France tries to enter the Super-premium 
segment. We believe this strategy could be a reasonable 
one, given the prevailing price ranges, the fact that 
production would be less regulated in the Chardonnay 
de France wine segment, and the way consumers buy 
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to determine the best system for promoting wine in 
a context of international competition. However, 
it underlines the essential role of promotion with 
economies of scale for reaching new markets. In-
deed, very simple assumptions will be considered 
for isolating the link between the market mecha-
nisms, the promotion cost, and the access to foreign 
markets such as the U.S. for the European wine 
producers. Moreover, we abstract from imperfect 
information issues linked to advertising, the role of 
which is simply to make consumers aware of the 
product and thus increase its demand. Despite these 
simplifying assumptions, we believe this model is a 
useful starting point for the policy discussion on the 
possible reform of the European AO system. 
The Model
Suppose we represent the choices of different wine-
producing regions in the EU; we initially consider 
for each region the choice of land allocation5 be-
tween the AO system and the table-wine segment. 
In the AO system producers are able to sell their 
wine in a market with a given willingness to pay 
for quality. In the table-wine segment each region 
has to face Cournot competition. We assume a fixed 
supply of land for each region, X, corresponding 
to the choices facing the agricultural sector in the 
short run and the fact that land suitable for wine 
production is a given. We consider the same land 
potential for each region, i.e., symmetric produc-
ing regions. 
We consider a very simple model of land al-
location (Figure 1). In the initial situation, each 
region decides how to allocated land between AO 
(a fraction ß) and table wines (fraction 1 − ß). At a 
different point in time, the producers may be faced 
with the opportunity to enter a new market. If they 
enter, they allocate a fraction (1 − γ) of the land to 
the new market and a fraction (γ) to the traditional 
market. In order to enter the new market, however, 
they have to invest in advertising, which has fixed 
costs A, and they need to join forces with other 
producing regions. Should they decide to enter 
into the new market, they would face (Cournot) 
competition from other countries already present 
in the new market. 
We represent the choices for each symmetric 
region with a three-stage game. In the first stage, 
each region has to decide whether whether to en-
ter the new market, where it would face Cournot 
competition from other world producers, and how 
much land to allocate to it (the fraction 1 − γ). In 
the second stage, it decides how much of the land 
allocated to the traditional market (the fraction γ) 
should be allocated to the AO system (a fraction 
ßγ), in which each region behaves as a monopolist, 
and how much to the table-wine segment (a fraction 
(1 − ß)γ), where it would face Cournot competi-
tion from other European regions in the traditional 
markets. 
In the last stage of the game, we have market 
competition: each region would be a monopolist 
in the AO high-quality market and an oligopolist 
à la Cournot in a homogeneous-products market. 
All the regions together would face the (Cournot) 
competition of the producers from the rest of the 
world in the new market. We can solve the game by 
backward induction (subgame perfect equilibrium). 
We characterize the different subgames in the next 
sections. 
The Traditional Markets
In the subgame for the traditional markets, at Stage 
3 we have the AO and the table-wine markets. The 
number of symmetric producing regions, m is exog-
enous. The available land for each region i is Xi. For 
simplicity, one unit of land gives one unit of final 
product in the low-quality segment, e.g., table wine. 
However, in the AO system, one unit of land gives 
k ≤ 1 unit of high-quality wines. k ≤ 1 takes into 
account the fact that often in the AO system yields 
are restricted to allow for higher quality. Trade oc-
curs in a single period, with each region producing 
high-quality and/or low-quality wine. Let s denote 
the level of high-quality wine that is exogenously 
given and equal for each region, and suppose for 
simplicity that there is no cost.
Each producing region i is selecting a proportion 
ßi of the total land Xi with 0 ≤ ß ≤ 1 allocated to the 
high-quality production linked to the AO system, 
5 We are dealing with a perennial crop but we are not 
modeling planting decisions. As a referee pointed out, 
the lag between planting and harvesting—on average, 
four years for grapes—would probably affect planting 
decisions. We believe, however, that the main results 
of the paper would not change, because we have no 
uncertainty in the model. In addition, to be more 
appropriate, we should refer to production allocation, 
but since we assume that production is fixed per unit 
of land, we use both land and production allocation to 
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and a proportion of land (1 − ß) ≤ 1 allocated to the 
low-quality wines, i.e., the table wines. The quality 
of the AO wine is known by all sellers and buyers. 
For simplicity, we assume that demands for low-
quality wine—both in internal and new markets—
and high-quality wines are completely independent. 
It may correspond to the wine market where the 
low-quality products are sold to consumers via the 
retailing sector while the high-quality products are 
sold in specialty shops or in restaurants. 
The AO Market
In the high-quality wine segment, each AO is a 
monopolist for its segment or product range. Buy-
ers want to purchase one unit of the good, and they 
differ in preferences over quality. Heterogeneous 
preferences are described by a uniformly distributed 
parameter θ ∈ [0,1]. For the sake of simplicity and 
without loss of generality, the mass of consumers 
is normalized at unity. For a level of quality s a 
consumer who buys one unit of product at a price 
p has an indirect utility equal to θs − p (Mussa and 
Rosen 1978).
Before detailing the equilibrium in the subgame, 
notice that as long as producing regions are symmet-
ric they apply the same strategy for the choice of ß 
and γ. In Stage 3 in the AO market the price for the 
high-quality product is determined by the producers 
(the region) after taking into account the equilibrium 
between the supply and the demand. On the demand 
side, the consumer with utility θ ¯s − p  is indifferent 
between buying and not buying a unit of wine of 
quality s, implying that her taste parameter is θ ¯ = p
s ¯. 
As the distribution of preferences is uniform, the 
demand for high-quality wine is D = 1 − p
s ¯, leading 
to an inverse demand equal to p = (1 − D)s. Taking 
into account the equilibrium condition, D = kX ß, 
the profit for each region is
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The Table-wine Market
Each region has also to decide whether to allocate 
land to, and if so, how much, to the table-wine 
market—that is, how much to produce, in. In this 
market, wines from different regions are relatively 
homogeneous and each region competes as a 
Cournot oligopolist. Suppose the demand in the 
market for table wine is 
(2)        Q = N1(a − pt),
where Q is the aggregate demand, N1 is the number 
of consumers, a is the size of the market and pt is 
the price of the table wine. The inverse demand is 
then
(3)        pt = a − 
Q
N1
Notice that by our assumption about the supply 
of land, by the symmetry of each producing region, 
and by noting that the land allocated is a fraction   
for each region, we obtain
(1 − ß)mX
(4)        pt = a − 
        N1
Thus the profit for each region becomes
(1 − ß)mX 
(5)        �T(a,m) = (1− ß) X [a −        N1         ].
Land Allocation
In Stage 2 of the subgame with traditional markets, 
each region has to maximize the profits from land al-
location between the AO and the table-wine market. 
The choice for the land may be represented by 
(6)        ß* = arg max
ß  �A(s,k) + �T(a,m)
where  and  are given by Equations (1) and (5). The 
optimal solution is
kN1s + 2mX − aN1 (7)        ß* =   2(m + k2N1s) 
.
It may be easier to interpret the results by letting   
N1 = m = X = 1, so we can simplify to
ks + 2 − a
(8)        ß* =   2 + 2k2s 
.
Please note that ß* increases with wine quality     
s in the AO market:
∂ß* 
= 
k(1+(a − 2)k 
 iff  
1
  > (2 − a). ∂s        2(1 + k2s)2         k
Indeed, the higher is the quality in the AO mar-
ket where each region is a monopolist, the higher 
the willingness-to-pay of consumers and thus the 
profits for a given quantity of wine. So it is natural 
to increase quantity, i.e., to allocate more land to 
AO, when quality and thus willingness-to-pay is 
higher.6 
Analogously, the land allocated to AO increases 
with the relative yields of AO wines, k:
∂ß* 
= 
s(1+ 2(a − 2)k − k2s 
 iff  
1
  > (2 − a)−ks. ∂s             2(1 + k2s)2       k
Other things being equal, the profitability of AO 
wines increases with their relative productivity; 
hence the higher the productivity, the higher the 
fraction of land allocated to AO. 
Given the optimal choice of ß, the profit for each 
region in the traditional markets is
a2 + 2ak(2k − 1)s + k(4 + k(s − 4)s (9) ΠT = (a,s,k,m) = 
     4 + 4k2s             
,
which after normalizing, i.e., by letting N1 = m = X 
= 1 and k = 1, becomes
(a + s)2
(10)      ΠT = 
4(1 + s)
.
Entering the New Market
The increase of income in new countries may offer 
some opportunities for the producing regions of the 
EU to enter into new markets. Indeed, the wine pro-
ducers of the New World are gaining market shares 
in these markets, and the restructuring taking place 
in the industry outside the EU has the objective 
to gain the critical mass to deal with the retailing 
sector in the new markets (The Economist, 2003; 
Marsh 2003a, 2003b). The wine sector in the EU 
is made of many small firms. Indeed, aside from 
some big Maisons in few regions—e.g., Bordeaux, 
Champagne, and Chianti—the rest of the industry is 
composed of many small vineyards, with producers 
selling to private wine producers of relatively small 
size or producing for local cooperatives. Since even 
these latter may lack the critical mass to make the 
6 This simple effect would be mitigated if we had some 
costs for quality improvement, but the overall effect would 
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advertising investments needed to enter the new 
markets, we consider the possibility for producers 
of different regions joining forces to be able to make 
the investments in advertising with a fixed cost A.
In addition, as it happens, we assume that those 
consumers buying wine in the retailing stores in the 
new markets prefer to buy wines based on grape va-
riety. For example, they prefer to buy Chardonnay, 
distinguishing among different producing regions if 
offered the opportunity, but do not like to buy wines 
from a blend of different grapes or of peculiar single 
grapes of which they face uncertain quality. In other 
words, new markets’ consumers do not know and 
do not buy the wines with an AO, or if they do they 
are not willing to pay the premium that traditional 
markets are willing to pay.7 
The situation we represent thus would have, for 
instance, all or many producing regions in France 
deciding to allocate part of their land to produce a 
white wine, e.g., Chardonnay, to be sold in the new 
market as, for example, “Chardonnay de France.” 
Each producing region would allocate a fraction 
(1 − γ) of land to the new market, while a fraction γ 
would remain for the traditional market; each would 
pay a share (1
m ¯ ) of the advertising costs A; and each 
would receive a fraction (1
m ¯ ) of the profits to be made 
in the new market.
In the new market, the producing regions of the 
EU would compete with other producers from the 
rest of the world. We assume that in the new mar-
ket, in case the regions of the EU decide to enter, 
there would emerge a duopoly,8 with the EU regions 
grouped together as a unique duopolist playing a 
Cournot game against the rest of the world, with 
the other producers from the New World acting as 
the other duopolist. The demand faced in the new 
market is
(11)      QN = N2(b − pN),
which would lead to an inverse demand
QN (12)      pN = b − N2
where QN = QR + mX(1 − γ), with QR being the pro-
duction of the rest of the world (R), and mX(1 − γ) 
being the total production from the EU wine-pro-
ducing regions allocated to the new market. The 
problem of the two competing duopolists would 
be to choose quantity—respectively QR and γ—to 
maximize their profits: 
QR + mX(1 − γ)
(13)      �R = (b −   Ν2    )QR,
QR + mX(1 − γ)
(14)      �N = (b −   Ν2    )mX(1 − γ) − A,
Land Allocation
At Stage 1, each group has to decide whether to 
enter into the new market and how much land to al-
locate to it (the fraction 1 − γ). Let us first rewrite the 
problem for the subgame of the traditional markets, 
considering now that only a fraction γ of land can 
be split into AO (hence a total fraction of γβ) and 
table wine (a total fraction of (1 − β)γ):
(1 − β)γmX (15)         max β       kXβγ(1 − kXβγ)s + (1 − β)γX [a −  
Ν1        ],
which solution—similar to the one calculated in 
the previous section, but now taking into account 
also that only a fraction γ goes to the traditional 
markets—is (again, letting N1 = m = X = 1 and k = 
1 to simplify the interpretation)
2γ − a + s (16)      ß*(γ) = 2γ(1 + s)  
.
Now the problem for the choice of the land to 
be allocated to the new market for each region, as-
suming all regions behave symmetrically, may be 
represented as
�A (17)      max γ    �A(β*) + �T(β*) + m  ,
7 As is well-explained in the literature, “there is a 
good evidence that the orientation towards varietal 
wines is one of the key factors in the success of new 
world wines. . . . Currently, even if the share of wine 
from these new wine countries as a proportion of total 
consumption is very small, but very well represented 
in premium segments, the role of these products in the 
revitalization of the wine market is fairly important and 
the marketing strategies of these countries (in terms of 
product positioning as well as marketing policies) are 
setting the stage for competition; in other words these 
new countries constitute the benchmark against which 
even the most prestigious EU producers must define their 
strategies …” (Pomarici 1999, 177).
8 We could also consider an oligopolistic market, 
which would not change the nature and interpretation 
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where
(18)      �A(β*) = kXβ*γ(1 − kXβ*γ)s
(1 − β)γmX (19)      �T(β*) = (1 − β*)γX[a − 
       Ν1        ],
QR + mX(1 − γ)
(20)      �N = (b −   Ν2    )mX(1 − γ) − A.
Solving this problem together with that of the 
duopoly with the rest of the world, and assuming 
interior solutions, we obtain (letting N2 = N1 = m = 
X = 1 and k = 1 for ease of interpretation)
3 + (5 + 2a)s − b(1 + s) (21)      γ* = 
    3 + 7s          
,
b + (a + 1)s + 3bs (22)      Q*
R =       
3 + 7s  
,
which also gives the optimal land allocated to 
AO:
(23)      β* =  
6 + 7s − 3a − 2b         
. 6 − 2b + 10s +4as − 2bs
As one would expect, notice that γ*, the optimal 
land allocated to the traditional markets, increases 
with the size of the traditional market:
∂γ* 
=     
2s 
  > 0; ∂a      3 + 7s
decreases with the size of the new market:
∂γ* 
=     
1 + s  
  < 0; ∂s      3 + 7s




6a − 6+ 4b 
> 0 iff 6a −  6 + 4b > 0. ∂s      (3 + 7s)2
Indeed, the higher the quality in the AO market, the 
higher are the profits for a given quantity of wine, 
and hence producers would increase the production 
in those markets. 
Analogously, the optimal land allocated to AO 
(β*) within the traditional markets increases with 
the size of the traditional market:
∂β* 
=     
(b − 3 − 2s)(3 + 7s)      
> 0 ∂a      2(b + bs − 5s − 3 − 2as)2
iff (b − 3 − 2s)(3 + 7s) > 0;
decreases with the size of the new market:
∂β* 
=     
(a − s)(3 + 7s)        
< 0 ∂b      2(b + bs − 5s − 3 − 2as)2
iff (a − s)(3 + 7s) > 0;




6a2 + 9b + a(3 + b) − 9 − 2b2  
< 0 ∂s        2(b + bs − 5s − 3 − 2as)2
iff 6a2 + 9b + a(3 + b) − 9 − 2b2 > 0.
Again, the higher the quality in the AO market, the 
higher the profits for a given quantity of wine and 
hence producers would increase the production in 
that market. 
Results and Policy Implications
Given the optimal choices of β and γ, we can cal-
culate the increment in profit for each region when 
it moves from staying in the traditional market to 
entering the new market as well:
(1 + 2s)(b + 2s + bs − 2as)2 − A(1 + s)(3 + 7s)2
ΠΔ(a,b,s,A) = ΠN + T (·) − ΠT (·) =
     (1 + s)(3 + 7s)2    ,
where ΠN + T (·) are the total profits, i.e., those in 
the traditional plus those in the new markets; and 
ΠT (·) are the profits for each group when they do 
not decide to enter the new markets. It is then profit-
able to join the other regions to make the collective 
investment in advertising and enter the new markets 
when, other things being equal, the size of the new 
market (the intercept b) is relatively big, when the 
traditional market (the intercept a) is relatively 
small, and when the size of the fixed investment in 
advertising A is relatively small as well. 
The increase in profits is also a complex function 
of the exogenous quality s and of the k parameter. To 
further discuss individual regions’ incentives to join 
the collective undertaking in advertising9 it would 
be useful to more fully investigate the effects of k 
and s and consider the possible heterogeneity of 
producing regions. This is beyond the scope of this 
9 In the comparison of the profits received from 
a traditional market strategy and those with a more 
aggressive strategy with collective advertising, we124   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Marette and Zago Advertising, Collective Action, and Labeling in the European Wine Markets   125
paper, but we could reasonably guess that when 
quality is higher—thus having higher willingness 
to pay, because we do not have any costs for qual-
ity here—we should also have less land allocated 
to table wine, in either the traditional or the new 
markets. More difficult to guess is the effect of k, 
since an increase in productivity for the AO system 
may increase its profitability but could also possibly 
require less o production. 
We may also expect different outcomes accord-
ing to the initial situation in the traditional markets. 
If we started from a situation in which s is high and 
the AO is relatively profitable, with relatively little 
production and land allocated to the table-wine 
segment, the profit increase from entering the new 
market would probably be low. In the opposite 
case, with low willingness-to-pay for quality in 
a particular AO and a relatively high fraction of 
production allocated to the table-wine market, one 
could reasonably expect a higher increase in profits. 
This would explain why the good AO regions—e.g., 
Bordeaux, Alsace, and Champagne—may not be 
interested in joining the “Chardonnay de France” 
project, which instead could be a viable solution 
for the market problems of relatively low-quality 
wine regions. 
Looking at the policy implications, we need to 
start from the principles that guide policy inter-
ventions in the wine sector in the EU. Since the 
traditional forms of intervention—e.g., market in-
tervention through public distillation of low-quality 
wines—are not sustainable, the EU is shifting more 
responsibilities to producers and their organizations, 
i.e., more self-regulation. Given this trend, one may 
wonder whether decisions left with producers of 
different regions, with possible differences among 
regions, would lead to a better equilibrium for the 
industry. Results on this matter are still controversial 
(Zago 2002), but the idea emerges that decisions 
based on majority-voting among heterogeneous 
agents may lead to suboptimal equilibria. For ex-
ample, producers from the better AO regions could 
try to impede such a marketing strategy, fearing that 
their reputation could be damaged (Cabral 2000).
An alternative would be a reform based on pub-
lic intervention, such as the Institut National des 
Appellations d’Origine (INAO) in France, rather 
than the choice of few powerful regions. In fact, 
such a reform could consider the different national 
wines as a unique portfolio and optimize overall 
reputation in an umbrella-branding fashion (Sul-
livan 1990) to maximize economic welfare via 
the positive externalities generated. In addition, 
contrary to regulation based on industry decisions, 
public regulation should also take into consideration 
consumers’ welfare. 
Conclusion
The European wine sector and its market organi-
zation is being reformed, with fewer distortionary 
subsidies and a marked shift toward a more market-
prone system in which producers may respond more 
efficiently to demand needs. In this context, the 
labeling system of European Union quality wines, 
based on the Appellation d’Origine regulation, is 
under consideration for possible reforms. After 
helping small and big producers alike to survive 
and make profits in the last decades, it is now seen 
as an obstacle to restructuring and consolidation 
in the European wine industry. Giving origin to a 
plethora of labels of local wines, it would impede 
the reaching of a needed critical mass to make the 
necessary investments to enter new markets. 
We consider the role for collective action in 
advertising investments and the profits that may 
result from the more aggressive marketing strategy 
of entering new markets. Other things being equal, 
there is a bigger profit increase from joining forces 
with other regions when the size of the new markets 
is big, the fixed costs of advertising are relatively 
low, and the market situation in the internal market 
is relatively bad. When producing regions differ in 
their potential for quality wine, they may also have 
different incentives to switch from more traditional 
marketing choices and enter into new markets. We 
also argue that possible modifications of the AO 
system to facilitate collective action and improve 
investment levels may be unlikely from a self-
regulating industry with heterogeneous regions. 
In addition, public initiative may be preferred 
when consumers’ concerns need to be taken into 
account. 
 have considered each region as behaving symmetrically 
and jointly with other regions. In fact, one may need to 
consider the individual incentives faced by the region 
when deciding whether to join the collective undertaking 
in advertising. In other words, the decision of individual 
regions may resemble that of a firm joining a cartel. If 
a region does not join the collective advertising—i.e., it 
free rides—it may save on its share of the fixed costs and 
still benefit from an amelioration of market conditions 
in the traditional Cournot market.126   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3)
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